Fidel Castro and his Cuba

Nothing Changes with particular Landlords throughout history. There is a particular style and way of going about things that the "Bay of Pigs" illustrates as a clear Architype.There is a way of thinking and a school of Philosophers that support a particular Doctrine that goes back to the 2nd Battle of Venice in 1509. Venice would have been obliterated if there was not a betrayal of all the Kings of Europe. All for financial control reasons. Nothing has changed since and the same as the Financial Medieval Period before all the way back to the Financial problems of the Romans.

 

Bay of Pigs Invasion

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Bay of Pigs Invasion
Part of the Cold War
Map showing the location of the Bay of Pigs
Date April 17–19, 1961 Location Bay of Pigs, southern Cuba Result Cuban government victory
Belligerents
Cuba	United States Cuban exiles
Commanders and leaders
Fidel Castro José Ramón Fernández Juan Almeida Bosque Che Guevara [1][2] Efigenio Ameijeiras	John F. Kennedy Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Pepe San Roman Erneido Oliva
Strength
c. 25,000 army[3] c. 200,000 militia[3][4] c. 9,000 armed police[3][4]	c. 1,500 ground forces[A]
Casualties and losses
176 killed[B] c. 4,000 wounded[C]	118 killed[D] 1,202 captured[E]

Political background

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful action by a CIA-trained force of Cuban exiles to invade southern Cuba, with support and encouragement from the US government, in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.
The conflict was launched in April 1961, less than three months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States. The Cuban armed forces, trained and equipped by Eastern Bloc nations, defeated the invading combatants within three days.
The main invasion landing took place at a beach named Playa Girón, located at the mouth of the bay. The invasion is named after the Bay of Pigs, although that is just one possible translation of the Spanish Bahía de Cochinos. In Cuba, the conflict is sometimes known as La Batalla de Girón, or just Playa Girón.

On March 17, 1960, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a document prepared by the 5412 Committee (also known as the 'Special Group'), at a meeting of the US National Security Council (NSC). The stated first objective of the plan began as follows:^[5]

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME
1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention.

The outline plan (code-named Operation Pluto) was organized by CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., under CIA Director Allen Dulles. Having experience in actions such as the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Dulles was confident that the CIA was capable of overthrowing the Cuban government as led by prime minister Fidel Castro since February 1959. The first detailed CIA plan proposed a ship-borne invasion at the old colonial city of Trinidad, Cuba, about 270 km (170 mi) south-east of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains in Sancti Spiritus province. Trinidad had good port facilities, it was closer to many existing counter-revolutionary activities, it had an easily defensible beachhead, and it offered an escape route into the Escambray Mountains. When that plan was rejected by the State Department, the CIA went on to propose an alternative plan. On April 4, 1961, President Kennedy then approved the Bay of Pigs plan (also known as Operation Zapata), because it had an airfield that would not need to be extended to handle bomber operations, it was further away from large groups of civilians than the Trinidad plan, and it was less militarily 'noisy,' that would make any future denial of direct US involvement more plausible. The invasion landing area was changed to beaches bordering the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in Las Villas Province, 150 km south-east of Havana, and east of the Zapata peninsula. The landings were to take place at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), and Caleta Buena Inlet (code-named Green Beach).^[6][7][8][9]
In March 1961, the CIA helped Cuban exiles in Miami to create the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), chaired by José Miró Cardona, former Prime Minister of Cuba in January 1959. Cardona became the de facto leader-in-waiting of the intended post-invasion Cuban government.^[10]

Existing anti-Castro resistance in Cuba

After the success of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, counter-revolutionary groups grew, particularly in the Escambray Mountains, where the War Against the Bandits guerrilla war continued sporadically until 1965. Prior to the invasion, the CIA supported and supplied various groups with arms and other resources, but they were not included in the invasion plans due to concerns about information security.^[6]:64 No quarter was given during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray Mountains, where former rebels from the War Against Batista took different sides.^[11] On 11 March 1961, Jesus Carreras and American William Alexander Morgan (a former Castro ally) were executed after trial.^[12][13]
On April 3, 1961, a bomb attack on militia barracks in Bayamo killed four militia and wounded eight more. On April 6, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by sabotage.^[14] On April 14, 1961, guerrillas led by Agapito Rivera fought Cuban government forces near Las Cruces, Montembo, Las Villas, where several government troops were killed and others wounded.^[14] Also on April 14, 1961, a Cubana airliner was hijacked and flown to Jacksonville, Florida; resultant confusion then helped discovery of the staged 'defection' of a B-26 and pilot at Miami on 15 April.^[15][16]:245

Preparation and training for invasion

In April 1960, the CIA began to recruit anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the Miami area. Until July 1960, assessment and training was carried out on Useppa Island and at various other facilities in South Florida, such as Homestead AFB. Specialist guerrilla training took place at Fort Gulick, Panama and at Fort Clayton, Panama.^[15][17]:78 For the increasing ranks of recruits, infantry training was carried out at a CIA-run base code-named JMTrax near Retalhuleu in the Sierra Madre on the Pacific coast of Guatemala.^[18] The exiles group named themselves Brigade 2506 (Brigada Asalto 2506).^[18] In summer 1960, an airfield (code-named JMMadd, aka Rayo Base) was constructed near Retalhuleu, Guatemala. Gunnery and flight training of Brigade 2506 aircrews was carried out by personnel from Alabama ANG (Air National Guard), using at least six Douglas B-26 Invaders in the markings of FAG (Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca), legitimate delivery of those to the FAG being delayed by about six months. An additional 26 B-26s were obtained from US military stocks, 'sanitized' at 'Field Three' to obscure their origins, and about 20 of them were converted for offensive operations by removal of defensive armament, standardization of the 'eight-gun nose', addition of underwing drop tanks and rocket racks.^[19][20] Paratroop training was at a base nicknamed Garrapatenango, near Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Training for boat handling and amphibious landings took place at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Tank training took place at Fort Knox, Kentucky and Fort Benning, Georgia. Underwater demolition and infiltration training took place at Belle Chase near New Orleans.^[9]
The CIA used Douglas C-54 transports to deliver people, supplies, and arms from Florida at night. Curtiss C-46s were also used for transport between Retalhuleu and the CIA base code-named JMTide (aka Happy Valley), at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. On April 9, 1961, Brigade 2506 personnel, ships, and aircraft started transferring from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.^[13]
In early 1961, Cuba's army possessed Soviet-designed T-34 and IS-2 Stalin tanks, SU-100 self-propelled 'tank destroyers', 122 mm howitzers, other artillery and small arms, plus Italian 105 mm howitzers. The Cuban air force armed inventory included Douglas B-26 Invader light bombers, Hawker Sea Fury fighters, and Lockheed T-33 jets, all remaining from the Fuerza Aérea del Ejército de Cuba (FAEC), the Cuban air force of the Batista government.^[18]
Anticipating an invasion, Che Guevara stressed the importance of an armed civilian populace, stating "all the Cuban people must become a guerrilla army, each and every Cuban must learn to handle and if necessary use firearms in defense of the nation."^[21]

Participants

US Government personnel

Recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami was organized by CIA staff officers E. Howard Hunt and Gerry Droller. Detailed planning, training and military operations were conducted by Jacob Esterline, Col. Jack Hawkins and Colonel Stanley W. Beerli under the direction of Richard Bissell, and his deputy Tracy Barnes.^[9]

Cuban government personnel

Already, Fidel Castro was known as, and addressed as, the commander-in-chief of Cuban armed forces, with a nominal base at 'Point One' in Havana. In early April 1961, Raúl Castro was assigned command of forces in the east, based in Santiago de Cuba. Che Guevara commanded western forces, based in Pinar del Río. Major Juan Almeida commanded forces in the central provinces, based in Santa Clara. Raúl Curbelo Morales was head of the air force. Sergio del Valle Jiménez was Director of Headquarters Operations at Point One. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the Head of the Revolutionary National Police. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez was Minister of the Interior and head of G-2 (Seguridad del Estado, or state security). His deputy was Comandante Manuel Piñeiro Losada, also known as 'Barba Roja'. Captain José Ramón Fernández was head of the School of Militia Leaders (Cadets) at Matanzas.^{[3][17]:169[22][23][24]}
Other commanders of units during the conflict included Major Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich, Major Filiberto Olivera Moya, Major René de los Santos, Major Augusto Martínez Sanchez, Major Félix Duque, Major Pedro Miret, Major Flavio Bravo, Major Antonio Lussón, Captain Orlando Pupo Pena, Captain Victor Dreke, Captain Emilio Aragonés, Captain Angel Fernández Vila, Arnaldo Ochoa, Orlando Rodriguez Puerta.^{[15][17][25][26]}
Soviet-trained Spanish advisors were brought to Cuba from Eastern Bloc countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet Armies during World War II, and became known as 'Hispano-Soviets', having long-resided in the Soviet Union. The most senior of these were the Spanish Communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Cuban-born Alberto Bayo.^[27] Ciutat de Miguel (Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) was an advisor to forces in the central provinces. The role of other Soviet agents at the time is uncertain, but some of them acquired greater fame later. For instance, two KGB colonels, Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba in about September 1959.^[28][29]

Prior warnings of invasion

The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, via their secret intelligence network, as well as loose talk by members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami, and was repeated in US and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the arson attack in the El Encanto department store in Havana on 13 April, killing one shop worker.^{[15][17]:123-125} The Cuban government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and 'Aragon', who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively.^[30] The general Cuban population was not well informed, except for CIA-funded Radio Swan.^[31] As of May 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the government’s hands.^[32][33]
On April 29, 2000 Washington Post article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place, and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later.^[34]
David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador to the US, stated that British intelligence analysis, as made available to the CIA, indicated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro, and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections.^[16]:264

Prelude to invasion

Air attacks on airfields (15 April)

During the night of 14/15 April, a diversionary landing was planned near Baracoa, Oriente Province, by about 164 Cuban exiles commanded by Higinio 'Nino' Diaz. Their mother ship, named La Playa or Santa Ana, had sailed from Key West under a Costa Rican ensign. Several US Navy destroyers were stationed offshore near Guantanamo Bay to give the appearance of an impending invasion fleet.^[35] The reconnaissance boats turned back to the ship after their crews detected activities by Cuban militia forces along the coastline.^{[3][17]:156–159[18][22][36][37]}
As a result of those activities, at daybreak, a Cuban Air Force reconnaissance sortie over the Baracoa area was launched from Santiago de Cuba. That was a FAR T-33, piloted by Lt Orestes Acosta, and it crashed fatally into the sea. On 17 April, his name was falsely quoted as a defector among the disinformation circulating in Miami.^[38]
At about 06.00 Cuba local time on 15 April 1961, eight Douglas B-26B Invader bombers in three groups simultaneously attacked three Cuban airfields at San Antonio de Los Baños and at Ciudad Libertad (formerly named Campo Columbia), both near Havana, plus the Antonio Maceo International Airport at Santiago de Cuba. The B-26s had been prepared by the CIA on behalf of Brigade 2506, and had been painted with the markings of the FAR (Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria), the air force of the Cuban government. Each was armed with bombs, rockets and machine guns. They had flown from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua, and were crewed by exiled Cuban pilots and navigators of the self-styled Fuerza Aérea de Liberación (FAL). The purpose of the action (code-named Operation Puma) was reportedly to destroy most or all of the armed aircraft of the FAR in preparation for the main invasion. At Santiago, the two attackers destroyed a C-47 transport, a PBY Catalina flying boat, two B-26s and a civilian DC-3 plus various other civilian aircraft. At San Antonio, the three attackers destroyed three FAR B-26s, one Sea Fury and one T-33, and one attacker diverted to Grand Cayman due to low usable fuel. At Ciudad Libertad, the three attackers destroyed only non-operational aircraft such as two P-47 Thunderbolts. One of those attackers was damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and ditched about 50 km north of Cuba with the loss of its crew Daniel Fernández Mon and Gaston Pérez. Its companion B-26, also damaged, continued north and landed at Boca Chica field (Naval Air Station Key West), Florida. The crew, José Crespo and Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo, were granted political asylum, and made their way back to Nicaragua the next day via Miami and the daily CIA C-54 flight from Opa-Locka Airport to Puerto Cabezas. Their B-26, purposely numbered 933, the same as at least two other B-26s that day for disinformation reasons, was held until late on 17 April.^[17]:130[38]

Deception flight (15 April)

About 90 minutes after the eight B-26s had taken off from Puerto Cabezas to attack Cuban airfields, another B-26 departed on a deception flight that took it close to Cuba but headed north towards Florida. Like the bomber groups, it carried false FAR markings and the same number 933 as painted on at least two of the others. Prior to departure, the cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by CIA personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the false appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. At a safe distance north of Cuba, the pilot feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the cowling, radioed a mayday call and requested immediate permission to land at Miami International airport. The pilot was Mario Zúñiga, formerly of the FAEC (Cuban Air Force), and after landing he masqueraded as 'Juan Garcia', and publicly claimed that three colleagues had also defected from the FAR. The next day he was granted political asylum, and that night he returned to Puerto Cabezas via Opa-Locka.^[20][38][39]

Reactions (15 April)

At 10:30am on 15 April at the United Nations, the Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa attempted to accuse the US of aggressive air attacks against Cuba, and that afternoon formally tabled a motion to the Political (First) Committee of the UN General Assembly. In response, US ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson stated that US armed forces would not "under any conditions" intervene in Cuba, and that the US would do everything in its power to ensure that no US citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. He also stated that Cuban defectors had carried out the attacks that day, and he presented a UPI wire photo of Zuniga's B-26 in Cuban markings at Miami airport. Stevenson was later embarrassed to realize that the CIA had lied to him and to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.^[8][13][22]
On 15 April, the national police, led by Efigenio Ameijeiras, started the process of arresting thousands of suspected anti-revolutionary individuals, and detaining them in provisional locations such as the Karl Marx Theatre, the moat of Fortaleza de la Cabana and the Principe Castle all in Havana, and the baseball park in Matanzas.^[12]

Phony war (16 April)

On the night of 15/16 April, the Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempted diversionary landing at a fresh location near Baracoa.^[22]
On 16 April, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged an armed uprising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, with only four surviving. Leonel Martinez and 3 others took to the countryside.^{[14][clarification needed]}
Following the air strikes on airfields on April 15, 1961, the FAR managed to prepare for armed action at least four T-33s, four Sea Furies and five or six B-26s. All three types were armed with machine guns for air-to-air combat and for strafing of ships and ground targets. CIA planners had failed to discover that the US-supplied T-33 jets had long been armed with M-3 machine guns. The three types could also carry bombs, for attacks against ships and tanks.^[40]
No additional air strikes against Cuban airfields and aircraft were specifically planned before 17 April, because B-26 pilots' exaggerated claims gave the CIA false confidence in the success of the 15 April attacks, until U-2 reconnaissance photos on 16 April showed otherwise. Late on 16 April, President Kennedy ordered cancellation of further airfield strikes planned for dawn on 17 April, to attempt plausible deniability of US direct involvement.^[9]
Late on April 16, 1961, the CIA/Brigade 2506 invasion fleet converged on 'Rendezvous Point Zulu', about 65 kilometres (40 mi) south of Cuba, having sailed from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua where they had been loaded with troops and other materiel, after loading arms and supplies at New Orleans. The US Navy operation was code-named Bumpy Road, having been changed from Crosspatch on 1 April 1961.^[9] The fleet, labelled the 'Cuban Expeditionary Force' (CEF), included five 2,400-ton (empty weight) freighter ships chartered by the CIA from the Garcia Line, and subsequently outfitted with anti-aircraft guns. Four of the freighters, Houston (code name Aguja), Río Escondido (code name Ballena), Caribe (code name Sardina), and Atlántico (code-name Tiburón), were planned to transport about 1,400 troops in seven battalions of troops and armaments near to the invasion beaches. The fifth freighter, Lake Charles, was loaded with follow-up supplies and some Operation 40 infiltration personnel. The freighters sailed under Liberian ensigns. Accompanying them were two LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) 'purchased' from Zapata Corporation then outfitted with heavy armament at Key West, then exercises and training at Vieques Island. The LCIs were Blagar (code-name Marsopa) and Barbara J (code-name Barracuda), sailing under Nicaraguan ensigns. The CEF ships were individually escorted (outside visual range) to Point Zulu by US Navy destroyers USS Bache, USS Beale, USS Conway, USS Cony, USS Eaton, USS Murray, USS Waller. A task force had already assembled off the Cayman Islands, including aircraft carrier USS Essex with task force commander John A. Clark (Admiral) onboard, helicopter assault carrier USS Boxer, destroyers USS Hank, USS John W. Weeks, USS Purdy, USS Wren, and submarines USS Cobbler and USS Threadfin. Command and control ship USS Northampton and carrier USS Shangri-La were also reportedly active in the Caribbean at the time. USS San Marcos was a Landing Ship Dock that carried three LCUs (Landing Craft Utility) and four LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicles, Personnel). San Marcos had sailed from Vieques Island. At Point Zulu, the seven CEF ships sailed north without the USN escorts, except for San Marcos that continued until the seven landing craft were unloaded when just outside the 5 kilometres (3 mi) Cuban territorial limit.^[13][15][41]

Invasion

Bahia de Cochinos 1961

Invasion day (17 April)

During the night of 16/17 April, a mock diversionary landing was organized by CIA operatives near Bahia Honda, Pinar del Rio Province. A flotilla of small boats towed rafts containing equipment that broadcasted sounds and other effects of a shipborne invasion landing. That was the source of Cuban reports that briefly lured Fidel Castro away from the Bay of Pigs battlefront area.^{[15][17]:183[22]}
At about 00:00 on April 17, 1961, the two CIA LCIs Blagar and Barbara J, each with a CIA 'operations officer' and an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) of five frogmen, entered the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) on the southern coast of Cuba. They headed a force of four transport ships (Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe and Atlántico) carrying about 1,400 Cuban exile ground troops of Brigade 2506, plus tanks and other armour in the landing craft. At about 01:00, the Blagar, as the battlefield command ship, directed the principal landing at Playa Girón (Blue Beach), led by the frogmen in rubber boats followed by troops from Caribe in small aluminum boats, then LCVPs and LCUs. The Barbara J, leading Houston, similarly landed troops 35 km further northwest at Playa Larga (Red Beach), using small fiberglass boats. Unloading troops at night was delayed, due to engine failures and boats damaged by unseen coral reefs. The few militia in the area succeeded in warning Cuban armed forces via radio soon after the first landing, before the invaders overcame their token resistance.^{[17]:161,167[22]}
At daybreak at about 06:30, three FAR Sea Furies, one B-26 and two T-33 jets started attacking those CEF ships still unloading troops. At about 06:50, and 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) south of Playa Larga, Houston was damaged by several rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33, and about 2 hours later captain Luis Morse intentionally beached it on the western side of the bay. About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180 survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. At about 07:00, two invading FAL B-26s attacked and sank the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship El Baire at Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines.^[22][38] They then proceeded to Girón to join two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack.
At about 07:30, five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action code-named Operation Falcon.^[42] About 30 men, plus heavy equipment, were dropped south of Australia sugar mill on the road to Palpite and Playa Larga, but the equipment was lost in the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road. Other troops were dropped at San Blas, at Jocuma between Covadonga and San Blas, and at Horquitas between Yaguaramas and San Blas. Those positions to block the roads were maintained for 2 days, reinforced by ground troops from Playa Girón.^[17]:206
At about 08:30, a FAR Sea Fury piloted by Carlos Ulloa Arauz crashed in the bay, due to stalling or anti-aircraft fire, after encountering a FAL C-46 returning south after dropping paratroops. By 09:00, Cuban troops and militia from outside the area had started arriving at Australia sugar mill, Covadonga and Yaguaramas. Throughout the day they were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically carried on flat-bed trucks.^[17]:195-196 At about 09:30, FAR Sea Furies and T-33s fired rockets at the Rio Escondido, that 'blew up' and sank about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Girón.^[18][22]
At about 11:00, a FAR T-33 attacked a FAL B-26 (serial number 935) piloted by Matias Farias who then survived a crashlanding on the Girón airfield, his navigator Eduardo Gonzales already killed by gunfire. His companion B-26 suffered damage and diverted to Grand Cayman Island; pilot Mario Zúñiga (the 'defector') and navigator Oscar Vega returned to Puerto Cabezas via CIA C-54 on 18 April. By about 11:00, the two remaining freighters Caribe and Atlántico, and the CIA LCIs and LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still pursued by FAR aircraft. At about 12:00, a FAR B-26 exploded due to heavy anti-aircraft fire from Blagar, and pilot Luis Silva Tablada (on his second sortie) and his crew of three were lost.^[20][22]
By 12:00 hundreds of militia cadets from Matanzas had secured Palpite, and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga, suffering many casualties during attacks by FAL B-26s. By dusk other Cuban ground forces were gradually advancing southward from Covadonga and southwest from Yaguaramas toward San Blas, and westward along coastal tracks from Cienfuegos towards Girón, all without heavy weapons or armour.^[22]
During the day three FAL B-26s were shot down by FAR T-33s, with the loss of pilots Raúl Vianello, José Crespo, Osvaldo Piedra and navigators Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo and José Fernández. Vianello's navigator Demetrio Pérez bailed out and was picked up by USS Murray. Pilot Crispín García Fernández and navigator Juan González Romero, in B-26 serial 940, diverted to Boca Chica, but late that night they attempted to fly back to Puerto Cabezas in B-26 serial 933 that Crespo had flown to Boca Chica on 15 April. In October 1961 the remains of the B-26 and its two crew were found in dense jungle in Nicaragua.^[38][43] One FAL B-26 diverted to Grand Cayman with engine failure. By 16.00, Fidel Castro had arrived at the central Australia sugar mill, joining José Ramón Fernández whom he had appointed as battlefield commander before dawn that day.^[17]:168
On April 17, 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (leader of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez, and immediately executed.^[44] The CIA was unaware or unconcerned at such repression's effects on the planned operation.^[13]
At about 21:00 on 17 April 1961, a night air strike by three FAL B-26s on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, reportedly due to incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission after take-off.^[20][40] Other sources allege that heavy anti-aircraft fire scared the aircrews, the resultant smoke perhaps a convenient excuse for "poor visibility".^[17]:138

Invasion day plus one (D+1) 18 April

By about 10.30 on 18 April, Cuban troops and militia, supported by tanks, took Playa Larga after Brigade forces had fled towards Girón in the early hours. During the day, Brigade forces retreated to San Blas along the two roads from Covadonga and Yaguaramas. By then, both Fidel Castro and José Ramón Fernández had re-located to that battlefront area.^[17]:207
At about 17.00 on 18 April, FAL B-26s attacked a Cuban column of 12 civilian buses leading trucks carrying tanks and other armour, moving southeast between Playa Larga and Punta Perdiz. The vehicles, loaded with civilians, militia, police and soldiers, were attacked with bombs, napalm and rockets, suffering heavy casualties. The six B-26s were piloted by two CIA contract pilots plus four pilots and six navigators from Brigade 2506 air force.^[22][38] The column later re-formed and advanced to Punta Perdiz, about 11 km northwest of Girón.^[17]:197

Invasion day plus two (D+2) 19 April

During the night of 18 April, a FAL C-46 delivered arms and equipment to the Girón airstrip occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces, and took off before daybreak on 19 April.^[45] The C-46 also evacuated Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named Chico Two) that had been shot down and crash-landed at Girón on 17 April.^[42]
The final air attack mission (code-named Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract air crews and pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. One FAR Sea Fury (piloted by Douglas Rudd) and two FAR T-33 (piloted by Rafael del Pino and Alvaro Prendes) shot down two of these B-26s, killing four American airmen.^[13]
Combat air patrols were flown by Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk jets of VA-34 squadron operating from USS Essex, with nationality and other markings removed. Sorties were flown to reassure Brigade soldiers and pilots, and to intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war.^[38]
Without direct air support, and short of ammunition, Brigade 2506 ground forces retreated to the beaches in the face of considerable onslaught from Cuban government artillery, tanks and infantry.^[18][46][47]
Late on 19 April, destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray (code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate retreating Brigade soldiers from beaches, before firing from Cuban army tanks caused Commodore Crutchfield to order a withdrawal.^[22]

Invasion day plus three (D+3) 20 April

From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties were flown by A4D-2Ns to obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. Reconnaissance flights are also reported of Douglas AD-5Ws of VFP-62 and/or VAW-12 squadron from USS Essex or another carrier, such as USS Shangri-La that was part of the task force assembled off the Cayman Islands.^[22][38]
On 21 April, Eaton and Murray, joined on 22 April by destroyers USS Conway and USS Cony, plus USS Threadfin (submarine) and a CIA PBY-5A Catalina flying boat, continued to search the coastline, reefs and islands for scattered Brigade survivors, about 24-30 being rescued.^[45]

Aftermath

Casualties

Aircrews killed in action totaled 6 from the Cuban air force, 10 Cuban exiles and 4 American airmen.^[20] Paratrooper Herman Koch Gene was killed in action, and the American airmen shot down were Thomas W. Ray, Leo F. Baker, Riley W. Shamburger and Wade C. Gray.^[22] In 1979, the body of Thomas 'Pete' Ray was repatriated from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted to his links to the agency, and awarded him the Intelligence Star.^[48] 114 Cuban exiles from Brigade 2506 were killed in action.^[D]
The final toll in Cuban armed forces during the conflict was 176 killed in action.^[B] Other Cuban forces casualties were between 500 and 4,000 (killed, wounded or missing)^[C] The airfield attacks on 15 April left 7 Cubans dead and 53 wounded.^[15]

Prisoners

"Havana gleefully noted the wealth of the captured invaders: 100 plantation owners, 67 landlords of apartment houses, 35 factory owners, 112 businessmen, 179 lived off unearned income, and 194 ex-soldiers of Batista."

— Life magazine ^[49]

On 19 April 1961, at least seven Cubans plus two CIA-hired US citizens (Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio province, after a two-day trial. On 20 April, Humberto Sorí Marin was executed at Fortaleza de la Cabaña, having been arrested on 18 March following infiltration into Cuba with 14 tons of explosives. His fellow conspirators Rogelio Gonzalez Corzo (alias 'Francisco Gutierrez'), Rafael Diaz Hanscom, Eufemio Fernandez, Arturo Hernandez Tellaheche and Manuel Lorenzo Puig Miyar were also executed.^{[12][14][17]:46[36][50]}
Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, including the Fortaleza de la Cabaña and El Morro Castle.^[36] Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia Ruano, and more than one hundred other insurgents were executed.^[8]
About 1,202 Brigade 2506 members were captured, of which nine died from asphyxiation during transfer to Havana in a closed truck. In May 1961, Fidel Castro proposed to exchange the surviving Brigade prisoners for 500 large farm tractors, valued at $28 million (US).^[16]:713 On 8 September 1961, 14 Brigade prisoners were convicted of torture, murder and other major crimes committed in Cuba before the invasion, five being executed and nine jailed for 30 years.^[3] Three confirmed as executed were Ramon Calvino, Emilio Soler Puig ('el Muerte') and Jorge King Yun ('el Chino').^[12][18] On 29 March 1962, 1,179 men were put on trial for treason. On 7 April 1962, all were convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On 14 April 1962, 60 wounded and sick prisoners were freed and transported to the US.^[3] On December 21, 1962, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and James B. Donovan, a US lawyer, signed an agreement to exchange 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine, sourced from private donations and from companies expecting tax concessions. On 24 December 1962, some prisoners were flown to Miami, others following on the ship African Pilot, plus about 1,000 family members also allowed to leave Cuba. On 29 December 1962, President John F. Kennedy attended a 'welcome back' ceremony for Brigade 2506 veterans at the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida.^[18]

Political reaction

Robert F. Kennedy's Statement on Cuba and Neutrality Laws, April 20, 1961

The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy Administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. In August 1961, during an economic conference of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy via Richard N. Goodwin, a secretary of the White House. It said: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever."^[51]
Additionally, Guevara answered a set of questions from Leo Huberman of Monthly Review following the invasion. In one reply, Guevara was asked to explain the growing number of Cuban counter-revolutionaries and defectors from the regime, to which he replied that the repelled invasion was the climax of counter revolution, and that afterwards such actions "fell drastically to zero." In regards to the defections of some prominent figures within the Cuban government, Guevara remarked that this was because "the socialist revolution left the opportunists, the ambitious, and the fearful far behind and now advances toward a new regime free of this class of vermin."^[52]
As CIA director Allen Dulles later stated, they thought that once the troops were on the ground any action required for success would be authorized to prevent failure as Eisenhower had done in Guatemala in 1954 after the invasion looked as if it was collapsing.^[53] President Kennedy was angered with the CIA's failure, and claimed he wanted "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."^[54] Kennedy commented to his journalist friend Ben Bradlee, "The first advice I'm going to give my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn."^[55]

Later analysis

Maxwell Taylor survey

On 22 April 1961, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, Robert F. Kennedy (Attorney General), Admiral Arleigh Burke and Allen Dulles (Director of Central Intelligence) to form the Cuba Study Group, to report on the lessons to be learned from the failed operation. On 13 June, General Taylor submitted the report of the Board of Inquiry to President Kennedy. The defeat was attributed to lack of early realization of the impossibility of success by covert means, inadequate aircraft, limitations of armaments, pilots and air attacks to attempt plausible deniability, and ultimately, loss of important ships and lack of ammunition.^[9]:324

CIA report

In November 1961, CIA inspector general Lyman B Kirkpatrick, authored a report 'Survey of the Cuban Operation', that remained classified top secret until 1996. Conclusions were:^[9]:99

1. The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from guerrilla support to overt armed action without any plausible deniability.
2. Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately communicate information and decisions internally and with other government principals.
3. Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.
4. Failure to sufficiently organize internal resistance in Cuba.
5. Failure to competently collect and analyze intelligence about Cuban forces.
6. Poor internal management of communications and staff.
7. Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.
8. Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training facilities and material resources.
9. Lack of stable policies and contingency plans.

In spite of vigorous rebuttals by CIA management of the findings, CIA Director Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell were all forced to resign by early 1962.^[7]
In later years, the CIA's behaviour in the episode became the prime example cited for the psychology paradigm known as groupthink syndrome.^[22]
In mid-1960, CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in Havana; in a 1997 interview with CNN, he said, "…all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."^[56]

Invasion legacy in Cuba

The invasion is often recognized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the April 15 air attacks on Cuban airfields, he declared the revolution "Marxist-Leninist".^[23] After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, that helped pave the way for the Cuban Missile Crisis a year and a half later. Castro was now increasingly wary of further US intervention, and more open to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure its security. There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (Defense Day), to prepare the population for an invasion.

Invasion legacy for Cuban exiles

Many who fought for the CIA in the conflict remained loyal after the event; some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 29 captains.^[57] By March 2007, about half of the Brigade had died.^[58]
In April 2010, the Cuban Pilot's Association debuted a monument at the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport memorializing the 16 aviators for the exile side killed during the battle.^[59] The memorial consists of an obelisk and a restored B-26 replica aircraft atop a large Cuban flag.^[60]

Playa Girón today

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Museo Giron

Museum of the invasion with a preserved Hawker Sea Fury.

Little remains of the original village, which in the 1960s was small and remote. It is still remote, with just a single road to the village and out again, but it has grown markedly since the invasion. Few people there today were residents at the time. The road from the north is marked by frequent memorials to the Cuban dead. There are billboards marking where invaders were rounded up and showing pictures of their being led away. Another at the entrance to the village quotes Fidel Castro's comment that the conflict was the "first defeat of Yankee imperialism." A two-room museum, with aircraft and other military equipment outside, shows pictures, arms and maps of the attack and photos of Cuban soldiers who died. Billboards and other material also remember the US-financed 'mercenaries'.

See also

• Cuba-United States relations
• Guantánamo Bay (Cuba)
• Swan Islands

Related conflicts

• Cuban Revolution (1959)
• Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose, 1961–1965)
• United States embargo against Cuba
• Operation Northwoods (1962)
• Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
• Special Activities Division
• Operation Ortsac (1962)
• Escambray Rebellion (War Against the Bandits, 1959–1965)

Explanatory notes

1. ^ 1,500 ground forces (including 177 paratroops) - c. 1,300 landed. Also Cuban exile aircrews, American aircrews, CIA operatives^[15]
2. ^ 176 Cuban government forces killed^[15][36]
3. ^ 500 Cuban forces wounded,^[17]:180 or 4,000 killed, missing or wounded (includes militias and armed civilians)^[18]:179
4. ^ 118 invaders killed (114 Cuban exiles plus 4 American aircrew)^[22]
5. ^ 1,202 Brigade members captured (1,179 tried; 14 tried previously for pre-invasion crimes; 9 died in transit)^[15]

Notes

1. ^ Kellner 1989, pp. 69-70. “Historians give Guevara, who was director of instruction for Cuba’s armed forces, a share of credit for the victory”
2. ^ Szulc (1986), p. 450 - "The revolutionaries won because Castro's strategy was vastly superior to the CIA's; because the revolutionary morale was high; and because Che Guevara as the head of the militia training programme and Fernandez as commander of the militia officers' school, had done so well in preparing 200,000 men and women for war."
3. ^ ^{a b c d e f g} Szulc (1986)
4. ^ ^{a b} FRUS X, documents 19, 24, 35, 245, 271
5. ^ FRUS VI, p. 850
6. ^ ^{a b} Jones (2008)
7. ^ ^{a b} Higgins (2008)
8. ^ ^{a b c} Faria (2002), pp. 93-98.
9. ^ ^{a b c d e f g} Kornbluh (1998)
10. ^ Bethell (1993)
11. ^ Dreke (2002), pp. 40–117.
12. ^ ^{a b c d} Thomas (1971)
13. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Bay of Pigs, 40 Years After: Chronology. The National Security Archive. The George Washington University. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html
14. ^ ^{a b c d} Corzo (2003), pp. 79–90
15. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i j} Fernandez (2001)
16. ^ ^{a b c} Schlesinger (1965)
17. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p} Rodriguez (1999)
18. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i} Johnson (1964)
19. ^ Overall, Mario E. (2003). Bay of Pigs: The Guatemalan Connection http://www.laahs.com/artman/publish/article_50.shtml
20. ^ ^{a b c d e} Hagedorn (2006)
21. ^ Kellner 1989, pp. 54-55.
22. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p} Wyden (1979)
23. ^ ^{a b} Kellner 1989, p. 69.
24. ^ Alfonso, Pablo. 2001. Los Ultimos Castristas. Centro de Documentacion y Formacion, Caracas. ISBN 978-980-07-5657-7, pp. 125–6.
25. ^ del Pino, Rafael (2002-03-02). "Como te Paga un Dictador" (in es). Network 54. http://www.network54.com/Forum/59476/thread/1015117960/last-1015117960/COMO+TE+PAGA+UN+DICTADOR. Retrieved 2007-12-24. 
26. ^ Dreke (2002)
27. ^ Paz-Sanchez (2001), pp. 189–99.
28. ^ British Foreign Office. Chancery American Department, Foreign Office, London September 2, 1959 (2181/59) to British Embassy Havana classified as restricted Released 2000 by among British Foreign Office papers. Foreign Offices Files for Cuba Part 1: Revolution in Cuba "in our letter 1011/59 May 6 we mentioned that a Russian workers' delegation had been invited to participate in the May Day celebrations here, but had been delayed. The interpreter with the party, which arrived later and stayed in Cuba a few days, was called Vadim Kotchergin although he was at the time using what he subsequently claimed was his mother's name of Liston (?). He remained in the background, and did not attract any attention." These two agents went on to train overseas personnel including Carlos the Jackal (Ilich Ramírez Sánchez) and subcomandante Marcos (Rafael Sebastián Guillén).
29. ^ "El campo de entrenamiento "Punto Cero" donde el Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) adiestra a terroristas nacionales e internacionales" (in es). Cuban American Foundation. 2005-11-07. http://www.canf.org/2005/1es/noticias-de-Cuba/2005-nov-07-el-campo-de-entrenamiento.htm. Retrieved 2009-01-25. ^{[dead link]}
30. ^ Welch and Blight (1998), p. 113.
31. ^ Montaner, Carlos Alberto (1999). "Viaje al Corazón de Cuba" (in es) (PDF). Plaza & Janés. http://www.firmaspress.com/viaje-al-corazon-de-cuba.pdf. 
32. ^ "The New York Times". 1960-05-26. p. 5. 
33. ^ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1983-10-04). "The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, Seventh Report — Chapter V". Organization of American States. http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cuba83eng/chap.5.htm. Retrieved 2004-12-24. 
34. ^ Galbraith, J.K. (2000) http://web.archive.org/web/20060904201459re_/utip.gov.utexas.edu/jg/archive/2000/crimesoimmense.pdf
35. ^ Wyden (1979), p. 172 (footnote †)
36. ^ ^{a b c d} Triay (2001), pp. 83-113
37. ^ FRUS X, document 198
38. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} Ferrer (1975)
39. ^ Szulc, Tad. Asylum Granted to Three Airmen. New York Times. 17 April 1961 http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bay-of-pigs/NYT-4-17-61d.htm
40. ^ ^{a b} MacPhall, Doug & Acree, Chuck (2003). Bay of Pigs: The Men and Aircraft of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force. http://www.laahs.com/artman/publish/article_38.shtml
41. ^ FRUS X, document 87
42. ^ ^{a b} Cooper, Tom (2003) Clandestine US Operations: Cuba, 1961, Bay of Pigs. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_154.shtml
43. ^ Pfeiffer, Jack. CIA Official History of the Bay of Pigs, Vol.I extract, document 141167. http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_options.asp
44. ^ "Nuevo Acción" (in es). http://www.nuevoaccion.com/. 
45. ^ ^{a b} FRUS X, document 110
46. ^ De Paz-Sánchez (2001)
47. ^ Vivés (1984)
48. ^ Thomas, Eric. "Local Man Forever Tied To Cuban Leader: Father Frozen, Displayed by Fidel Castro". KGO ABC7, KGO-TV/DT. http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=assignment_7&id=5056129. Retrieved 2007-02-22. 
49. ^ Bay of Pigs: Invasion and Aftermath by Life magazine, caption for the image entitled "Jose Miro Greets His Ransomed Son"
50. ^ Ros (1994), pp. 181-185
51. ^ Anderson (1997), p. 509
52. ^ Huberman. Cuba and the U.S. interview with Che Guevara, Monthly Review, September 1961
53. ^ Reeves, Richard (1993), pp. 71, 673.
54. ^ "CIA: Maker of Policy or Tool?." New York Times. April 25, 1966
55. ^ Dallek (2003) An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963, p. 368
56. ^ Hunt, Howard (1997). "Episode 18: Backyard". Cold War. CNN. Archived from the original on 2007-11-06. http://web.archive.org/web/20071106000444/http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/. Retrieved 2010-05-20. 
57. ^ Ros, Enrique (1994), pp. 287–98.
58. ^ Iuspa-Abbott, Paola. "Palm Beach County Bay of Pigs veterans remember invasion of Cuba". South Florida Sun-Sentinel. http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/cubanews/2007w13/msg00006.htm. Retrieved 2007-03-27. ^{[dead link]}
59. ^ B-26 Bomber is part of Airport Monument by Richard Yager, Miami's Community Newspapers
60. ^ Video: Miami Unveils Monument to Cuban Pilots NBC News Miami, April 16, 2010

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FOR THE HISTORCAL RECORD Driving through the gates of hell

Middle East      Feb 10, 2011

DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA Driving through the gates of hell By Tom Engelhardt As we've watched the dramatic events in the Middle East, you would hardly know that we had a thing to do with them. Oh yes, in the name of its "war on terror", Washington had for years backed most of the thuggish governments now under siege or anxious that they may be next in line to hear from their people. When it came to Egypt in particular, there was initially much polite (and hypocritical) discussion in the media about how our "interests" and our "values" were in conflict, about how far the US should back off its support for the President Hosni Mubarak regime, and about what a "tightrope" the Barack Obama administration was walking. While the president and his officials flailed, the mildest of questions were raised about how much we should chide our erstwhile allies, or encourage the massed protestors, and about whether we should "take sides" (as though we hadn't done so decisively over the last decades). . With popular cries for "democracy" and "freedom" sweeping through the Middle East, it's curious to note that the George W Bush-era's now-infamous "democracy agenda" has been nowhere in sight. In its brief and disastrous life, it was used as a battering ram for regimes Washington loathed and offered as a soft pillow of future possibility to those it loved. Still, make no mistake, there's a story in a Washington stunned and "blindsided," in an administration visibly toothless and in disarray as well as dismayed over the potential loss of its Egyptian ally, "the keystone of its Middle Eastern policy", that's so big it should knock your socks off. And make no mistake: part of the spectacle of the moment lies in watching that other great power of the Cold War era finally head ever so slowly and reluctantly for the exits. You know the one I'm talking about. In 1991, when the Soviet Union disappeared and the United States found itself the last superpower standing, Washington mistook that for a victory most rare. In the years that followed, in a paroxysm of self-satisfaction and amid clouds of self-congratulation, its leaders would attempt nothing less than to establish a global Pax Americana. Their breathtaking ambitions would leave hubris in the shade. The results, it's now clear, were no less breathtaking, even if disastrously so. Almost 20 years after the lesser superpower of the Cold War left the world stage, the "victor" is now lurching down the declinist slope, this time as the other defeated power of the Cold War era. So don't mark the end of the Cold War in 1991 as our conventional histories do. Mark it in the early days of 2011, and consider the events of this moment a symbolic goodbye-to-all-that for the planet's "sole superpower". Abroads, near and far The proximate cause of Washington's defeat is a threatened collapse of its imperial position in a region that, ever since president Jimmy Carter proclaimed his Carter Doctrine in 1980, has been considered the crucible of global power, the place where, above all, the Great Game must be played out. Today, "people power" is shaking the "pillars" of the American position in the Middle East, while - despite the staggering levels of military might the Pentagon still has embedded in the area - the Obama administration has found itself standing by helplessly in grim confusion. As a spectacle of imperial power on the decline, we haven't seen anything like it since 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down. Then, too, people power stunned the world. It swept like lightning across the satellite states of Eastern Europe, those "pillars" of the old Soviet empire, most of which had (as in the Middle East today) seemed quiescent for years. It was an invigorating time. After all, such moments often don't come once in a life, no less twice in 20 years. If you don't happen to be in Washington, the present moment is proving no less remarkable, unpredictable, and earthshaking than its predecessor. Make no mistake, either (though you wouldn't guess it from recent reportage): these two moments of people power are inextricably linked. Think of it this way: as we witness the true denouement of the Cold War, it's already clear that the "victor" in that titanic struggle, like the Soviet Union before it, mined its own positions and then was forced to watch with shock, awe, and dismay as those mines went off. Among the most admirable aspects of the Soviet collapse was the decision of its remarkable leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, not to call the Red Army out of its barracks, as previous Soviet leaders had done in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Prague in 1968. Gorbachev's conscious (and courageous) choice to let the empire collapse rather than employ violence to try to halt the course of events remains historically little short of unique. Today, after almost two decades of exuberant imperial impunity, Washington finds itself in an uncomfortably unraveling situation. Think of it as a kind of slo-mo Gorbachev moment - without a Gorbachev in sight. What we're dealing with here is, in a sense, the story of two "abroads". In 1990, in the wake of a disastrous war in Afghanistan, in the midst of a people's revolt, the Russians lost what they came to call their "near abroad", the lands from Eastern Europe to Central Asia that had made up the Soviet Empire. The US, being the wealthier and stronger of the two Cold War superpowers, had something the Soviets never possessed. Call it a "far abroad". Now, in the midst of another draining, disastrous Afghan war, in the face of another people's revolt, a critical part of its far abroad is being shaken to its roots. In the Middle East, the two pillars of American imperial power and control have long been Egypt and Saudi Arabia - along with obdurate Israel and little Jordan. In previous eras, the chosen bulwarks of "stability" and "moderation", terms much favored in Washington, had been the Shah of Iran in the 1960s and 1970s (and you remember his fate), and Saddam Hussein in the 1980s (and you remember his fate, too). In the larger region the Bush administration liked to call "the Greater Middle East" or "the arc of instability", another key pillar has been Pakistan, a country now in destabilization mode under the pressure of a disastrous American war in Afghanistan. And yet, without a Gorbachevian bone in its body, the Obama administration has still been hamstrung. While negotiating madly behind the scenes to retain power and influence in Egypt, it is not likely to call the troops out of the barracks. American military intervention remains essentially inconceivable. Don't wait for Washington to send paratroopers to the Suez Canal as those fading imperial powers France and England tried to do in 1956. It won't happen. Washington is too drained by years of war and economic bad times for that. Facing genuine shock and awe (the people's version), the Obama administration has been shaken. It has shown itself to be weak, visibly fearful, at a loss for what to do, and always several steps behind developing events. Count on one thing: its officials are already undoubtedly worried about a domestic political future in which the question (never good for Democrats) could be: Who lost the Middle East? In the meantime, their oh-so-solemn, carefully calibrated statements, still in command mode, couched in imperial-speak, and focused on what client states in the Middle East must do, might as well be spoken to the wind. Like the Cheshire Cat's grin, only the rhetoric of the last decades seems to be left. The question is: How did this happen? And the answer, in part, is: blame it on the way the Cold War officially ended, the mood of unparalleled hubris in which the United States emerged from it, and the unilaterialist path its leaders chose in its wake. Let's do a little reviewing. Second-wave unilateralism When the Soviet Union dissolved, Washington was stunned - the collapse was unexpected despite all the signs that something monumental was afoot - and then thrilled. The Cold War was over and we had won. Our mighty adversary had disappeared from the face of the Earth. It didn't take long for terms like "sole superpower" and "hyperpower" to crop up, or for dreams of a global Pax Americana to take shape amid talk about how our power and glory would outshine even the Roman and British empires. The conclusion that victory - as in World War II - would have its benefits, that the world was now our oyster, led to two waves of American "unilateralism" or go-it-alone-ism that essentially drove the car of state directly toward the nearest cliff and helped prepare the way for the sudden eruption of people power in the Middle East. The second of those waves began with the fateful post-9/11 decision of Bush, vice president Dick Cheney, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and company to "drain the global swamp" (as they put it within days of the attacks in New York and Washington). They would, that is, pursue al-Qaeda (and whomever else they decided to label an enemy) by full military means. That included the invasion of Afghanistan and the issuing of a with-us-or-against-us diktat to Pakistan, which reportedly included the threat to bomb that country "back to the Stone Age". It also involved a full-scale militarization, Pentagonization, and privatization of American foreign policy, and above all else, the crushing of Iraqi dictator Saddam and the occupation of his country. All that and more came to be associated with the term "unilateralism", with the idea that US military power was so overwhelming Washington could simply go it alone in the world with any "coalition of the billing" it might muster and still get exactly what it wanted. That second wave of unilateralism, now largely relegated to the memory hole of history by the mainstream media, helped pave the way for the upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, and possibly elsewhere. As a start, from Pakistan to North Africa, the Bush administration's global "war on terror", along with its support for thuggish rule in the name of fighting al-Qaeda, helped radicalize the region. (Remember, for instance, that while Washington was pouring billions of dollars into the American-equipped Egyptian army and the American-trained Egyptian officer corps, Bush administration officials were delighted to enlist the Hosni Mubarak regime as "war on terror" warriors, using Egypt's jails as places to torture terror suspects rendered off any streets anywhere.) In the process, by sweeping an area from North Africa to the Chinese border that it dubbed the Greater Middle East into that "war on terror", the Bush administration undoubtedly gave the region a newfound sense of unity, a feeling that the fate of its disparate parts was somehow bound together. In addition, Bush's top officials, fundamentalists all when it came to US military might and delusional fantasists when it came to what that military could accomplish, had immense power at its command: the power to destroy. They gave that power the snappy label "shock and awe", and then used it to blow a hole in the heart of the Middle East by invading Iraq. In the process, they put that land, already on the ropes, onto life support. It's never really come off. In the wars, civil and guerrilla, set off by the American invasion and occupation, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis undoubtedly died and millions were sent into exile abroad or in their own land. Today, Iraq remains a barely breathing carcass of a nation, unable to deliver something as simple as electricity to its restive people or pump enough oil to pay for the disaster. At the same time, the Bush administration sat on its hands while Israel had its way, taking Palestinian lands via its settlement policies and blowing its own hole in southern Lebanon with American backing (and weaponry) in the summer of 2006, and a smaller hole of utter devastation through Gaza in 2009. In other words, from Lebanon to Pakistan, the Greater Middle East was destabilized and radicalized. The acts of Bush's officials couldn't have been rasher, or more destructive. They managed, for instance, to turn Afghanistan into the globe's foremost narco-state, even as they gave new life to the Taliban - no small miracle for a movement that, in 2001, had lost any vestige of popularity. Most crucial of all, they and the Obama administration after them spread the war irrevocably to populous, nuclear-armed Pakistan. To their mad plans and projects, you can trace, at least in part, the rise to power of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza (the only significant result of Bush's "democracy agenda", since Iraq's elections arrived, despite Bush administration opposition, due to the prestige of Ayatollah Ali Sistani). You can credit them with an Iran-allied Shi'ite government in Iraq and a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as the growth of a version of the Taliban in the Pakistani tribal borderlands. You can also credit them with the disorganization and impoverishment of the region. In summary, when the Bush unilateralists took control of the car of state, they souped it up, armed it to the teeth, and sent it careening off to catastrophe. How hollow the neo-conservative quip of 2003 now rings: "Everyone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to Tehran." But remember as well that, however much the Bush administration accomplished (in a manner of speaking), there was a wave of unilateralism, no less significant, that preceded it. Our financial jihadis Though we all know this first wave well, we don't usually think of it as "unilateralist", or in terms of the Middle East at all, or speak about it in the same breath with the Bush administration and its neo-con supporters. I'm talking about the globalists, sometimes called the neo-liberals, who were let loose to do their damnedest in the good times of the post-Cold-War Bill Clinton years. They, too, were dreamy about organizing the planet and about another kind of American power that was never going to end: economic power. (And, of course, they would be called back to power in Washington in the Obama years to run the US economy into the ground yet again.) They believed deeply that we were the economic superpower of the ages, and they were eager to create their own version of a Pax Americana. Intent on homogenizing the world by bringing American economic power to bear on it, their version of shock-and-awe tactics involved calling in institutions like the International Monetary Fund to discipline developing countries into a profitable kind of poverty and misery. In the end, as they gleefully sliced and diced subprime mortgages, they drove a different kind of hole through the world. They were financial jihadis with their own style of shock-and-awe tactics and they, too, proved deeply destructive, even if in a different way. The irony was that, in the economic meltdown of 2008, they finally took down the global economy they had helped "unify". And that occurred just as the second wave of unilateralists were facing the endgame of their dreams of global domination. In the process, for instance, Egypt, the most populous of Arab countries, was economically neo-liberalized and - except for a small elite who made out like the bandits they were impoverished. Talk about "creative destruction"! The two waves of American unilateralists nearly took down the planet. They let loose demons of every sort, even as they ensured that the world's first experience of a sole superpower would prove short indeed. Heap onto the rubble they left behind the global disaster of rising prices for the basics - food and fuel - and you have a situation so combustible that no one should have been surprised when a Tunisian match lit it aflame. That this moment began in the Greater Middle East should be no surprise either. That it might not end there should not be ruled out. This looks like, but may not be, an "Islamic" moment. If the second wave of American unilateralists ensured that this would start as a Middle Eastern phenomenon, conditions for people power movements exist elsewhere as well. The gates of hell Nobody today remembers how, in September 2004, Amr Musa, the head of the Arab League, described the post-invasion Iraqi situation. "The gates of hell," he said, "are open in Iraq." This was not the sort of language we were used to hearing in the US, no matter what you felt about the war. It read - and probably still reads - like an over-the-top metaphor, but it could as easily be taken as a realistic depiction of what happened not just in Iraq, but in the Greater Middle East and, to some extent, in the world. Our unilateralists twice drove blithely through those gates, imagining that they were the gates to paradise. The results are now clear for all to see. And don't forget, the gates of hell remain open. Keep your eyes on at least two places, starting with Saudi Arabia, about which practically no one is yet writing, though one of these days its situation could turn out to be shakier than now imagined. Certainly, whoever controls the Saudi stock market thought so, because as the situation grew more tumultuous in Egypt, Saudi stocks took a nosedive. With Saudi Arabia, you couldn't get more basic when it comes to US policy or the fate of the planet, given the amount of oil still under its desert sands. And then don't forget the potentially most frightening country of all, Pakistan, where the final gasp of America's military unilateralists is still playing itself out as if on a reel of film that just won't end. Yes, the Obama administration may squeeze by in the region for a while. Perhaps the Egyptian high command - half of which seems to have been in Washington at the moment the you-know-what hit the fan in their own country will take over and perhaps they will suppress people power again for a period. Who knows? One thing is clear inside the gates of hell: whatever wild flowers or weeds turn out to be capable of growing in the soil tilled so assiduously by the victors of 1991, Pax Americana proved to be a Pox Americana for the region and the world. Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. He also edited The World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire (Verso, 2008), an alternative history of the mad Bush years. His latest book is The American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama's (Haymarket Books). You can catch him discussing war American-style and that book in a Timothy MacBain TomCast video by clicking here. (Used by permission Tomdispatch) (Copyright 2011 Tom Engelhardt.) What is never presented to the  reader is the Economic History of the Money Lenders and how they make a profit out of the continious struggle of humanity. This is an uninterrupted history of incredile stablility. As a business it is Blue Ribbon safe. As the struggles goes on, so do all the innocent animals die along with any untarnished perspective given by an eco-system or any person with comon sense. However, the Old Testemant makes it very clear that the innocent must be sacrificed for projects deemed good by the chosen ones. And we all accept this quietly as we watch the world die before our eyes.

Asia Times online article:

China Business      Feb 10, 2011

Chinese puzzle By Antal E Fekete There is really just one question about China for the Western mindset. How could the Chinese have made the colossal mistake of investing their hard-earned savings in the debt of the US government - to the tune of US$1 trillion, the largest sum one country has ever loaned another in all history. (There is only one other puzzle greater than this: How could the US government in good faith allow its debt to accumulate in Chinese hands? But we leave that question for another occasion to discuss). US debt is easy to buy but hard to get rid of. The harder, the larger are the sums involved. It is true that a huge bull market in bonds has been rolling on for the past 30 years - since 1981. But putting all of China's eggs into the same basket was a terrible mistake even if we ignore the reckless fiscal and monetary policy the US government has been pursuing since 1971. Belatedly, the Chinese are trying to correct their mistakes through diversification. China could have learned from Japan's sad example. Before the Chinese appeared as buyers, Japan was the largest investor in US debt. In 1971, Japan was running an unprecedented trade surplus vis-a-vis the US, and the exchange rate of the Japanese yen was 300 to the dollar. American policymakers and money doctors put enormous pressure on Japan to let the yen float upwards, as this was the "in thing" to do after the Nixon-Friedman conspiracy made the US default on its foreign gold obligations "respectable", on the spurious theory that this would first ease, then eliminate the American trade deficit. Japan, in effect still an occupied country, yielded to the American pressure and the yen rose so that by 1981 only 100 yen were needed to buy one dollar. This was a three-fold appreciation of the yen, but it did not bring about an improvement in the American trade deficit with Japan, as promised by Friedmanite propagandists. Instead, there was a 10-fold further deterioration! Yet the Americans did not revise their policy recommendations, and continued to insist on floating the yen upwards. It appeared that the Americans had a hidden agenda that was not the elimination of the American trade deficit. Could it have been abatement of the American debt? Indeed, the yen-value of Japan's foreign exchange reserves held in dollars was cut by two-thirds as a result of foreign exchange policy forced upon Japan. The Chinese should have seen the writing on the wall: buying dollar-denominated assets was tantamount to kissing good-by to your savings. In terms of the Nixon-Friedman conspiracy this was extortion, an underhanded way of secretly siphoning off the savings of America's trading partners running surpluses, disguised as exchange-rate policy. Worse still, when the Japanese wanted to draw on the remnants of their savings held in American banks to tie them over temporary cash shortages, they found that the money wasn't there. The American money-doctors were ever-ready to come up with a solution. The Japanese government had excellent credit rating and no debt to foreigners. Why not borrow the money it needed? Once more, the Japanese meekly complied. They swapped their temporary need for dollars for permanent government debt in yen. By now the Japanese government has the worst indebtedness on record: it would take two years of Japan's GDP to pay it off. See the vicious combination: selling bonds in an appreciating currency while buying bonds in a depreciating currency? A free one-way ticket to the poorhouse. China should have seen the trap. The Americans want them to buy all the dollar-denominated bonds. Then they would start twisting arms to let the yuan float upwards, ostensibly as a valid exchange-rate mechanism to rectify trade imbalances. Clearly, it is not a valid mechanism because, well, it does not work. It only makes the trade imbalance worse. Neither are the Americans shooting for elimination of their trade deficit. They are shooting for an abatement of America's debt. They know that higher exchange rate for the yuan means imperceptibly siphoning off China's savings. An indigent country, China, underwrote with its savings the profligacy of an affluent country, the US. Unbelievably, China appears to be caving in to American demands and let the yuan float upwards. If the Chinese wanted to draw on the remnants of their savings held in American banks, they might just find out, as the Japanese did before them, that the money isn't there. It can be safely predicted that the American debt-mongers would again be on hand to come up with the solution. China has excellent credit rating and zero debt to foreigners. The Chinese should borrow the dollars they need, to tie themselves over, rather than liquidate their dollar holdings. Like Japan earlier, China, too, could swap its temporary dollar shortage for permanent government debt in the domestic currency. This is debauchery: Mephistopheles trying to corrupt the uncorrupted. This is lacing foreign banking systems with toxic debt. The Chinese puzzle can be stated as follows. The irrational and masochistic behavior of the Japanese can be explained by the fact that Japan was still an occupied country. But China is not. China could refuse to listen to the siren-song of the American exchange-rate manipulators and debt-mongers. Why doesn't China stand up to this corruption? "Just say no" to the drug of indebtedness, and expose the debauchery behind it! Here is the explanation of the Chinese puzzle from a non-Chinese perspective. The 1972 popping up of Nixon in China (which was worth composing an opera on the theme) started the pilgrimage of young uncorrupted Chinese scholars to American universities. Well, at least those among them who were economists, monetary scientists, and banking experts have been thoroughly corrupted and brainwashed. Keynesian and Friedmanite theories have been pumped into them through force-feeding. They have never been told that there is a coherent and respectable body of economic knowledge refuting, point-by-point, the false and corrosive economic theories of Keynes and Friedman. China utterly lacks scholars who are well-versed in Austrian economics and in valid monetary theory, to provide antidote for the Keynesian and Friedmanite poison. China was made a fertile ground for American debauchery. Friedman's theory of deliberate use of foreign exchange rates as a tool of balancing foreign trade is vicious, false, and fraudulent. It has never worked. It never will. It is motivated by American self-interest, ready to wage a new opium war on China, to reduce the indebtedness of the US through a disguised devaluation of the dollar, at the expense of its trading partners, and to push the responsibility for the trade imbalance on the surplus countries. The correct solution to the trade problem is not the flotation of currencies up and down. Quite to the contrary: the solution is the stabilization of foreign exchange rates! China badly needs advisers who are able to show the way in this direction. Antal E Fekete has since 2001 been consulting professor at Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. In 1996, Professor Fekete won the first prize in the International Currency Essay contest sponsored by Bank Lips Ltd of Switzerland. (Copyright 2011 Antal E Fekete.) From March 5 through 13, 2011, the New Austrian School of Economics will hold a course on "Adam Smith's Real Bills doctrine and circulating capital at the Martineum Academy in Szombathely, Hungary. This is the second in a four-course series on Austrian Economics, a branch of economic science based on the work of Carl Menger (1840-1921). It is meant for those, including beginners, who are interested in the theory of money, credit, and banking, with special emphasis on the current financial and economic crisis. On Monday, March 14, the school will hold a seminar on "Basis, Co-basis, Permanent Backwardation of Gold and Silver and What It Means", the third in the series. For further information on both course and seminar, please contact Dr Judith Szepesvari, e-mail: szepesvari17@gmail.com.

The Hmong Genral Van Pou

 

Hmong honour general who fought secret war for CIA

Mark Arax, Fresno

February 8, 2011

Hmong mourners watch General Vang Pao's funeral procession in Fresno. Photo: AFP

IF VANG Pao had died a simple farmer like so many other Hmong here, his funeral would have been an elaborate affair.
For three days, as Hmong custom has it, his family and friends would have mourned in high-pitched chants, feasted on freshly slaughtered beef and burnt a giant pile of fake currency to buy his soul into the spirit world.
But General Vang Pao was no plain Hmong elder, and his death last month at age 81 has brought forth no ordinary grief. He is known to his people as the general, the hero of the Central Intelligence Agency's long-ago secret war in the jungles of Laos, a man who was leaving behind 25 children, 68 grandchildren and an uprooted nation of Hmong refugees who regard him as something near a king.

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Lt-Col. Vang Pao in 1961. Photo: Getty Images

So his funeral - six days and nights, with 10 cows slaughtered and stir-fried each day - has become a send-off for the ages.
It began last Friday, his body borne on a horse-drawn carriage through the streets of Fresno, California, throngs of grieving Hmong lining the way. Scottish bagpipers played The Green Hills of Tyrol and two T-28 planes, the aircraft piloted by Hmong guerilla fighters in the Vietnam War, flew overhead.
And the funeral rolled down a long red carpet at the weekend, as thousands more Hmong from across the country, and some from as far away as Thailand and France, strode into the convention centre of this farming capital of California to say goodbye.
Many of the Hmong here - tens of thousands of tribal people who emigrated from Thai refugee camps in the 1970s, '80s and '90s - wanted to see Vang Pao buried at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honours, befitting a man, they say, whose Hmong battalions saved the lives of many downed American pilots. But on Friday, the Pentagon announced that it had denied the family's request to waive the policy that restricts military burials at Arlington to US service members.
Vang Pao's family and friends said they were disappointed by the decision. ''The CIA recruited General Vang Pao in 1961 to lead a guerilla force,'' a statement read. ''He fought in combat situations for 15 years. The covert war resulted in the death of 35,000 of the general's men.
''We strongly believe the right thing to do is to honour his contributions to the United States.''
NEW YORK TIMES


This war continues without pause. It may be the longest war in recent history and no one take responsibility for the ongoing destruction of the Hmong People and Land. Rather is is accepted that this animistic culture be destroyed.

I wish to take note that these people and way of life and place of life is a vital school of teaching and demonstration of what success is and how success can be achieved. The Hmong are the most successful society on this world that offer the secrets of immortality of human life.The wisdom these people carry should not be exterminated by planned and deliberate war of eradication.

The oldest remnant Celtic Pagan Goddess worshiping society in Europe lasted till 1550 and it was on the remote Dalmatian coastline of Croatia. Its demise coincided with the instigation of the Papal Inquisition administered right across Europe for 200 years there after. The genocide statistics of exterminated women alone goes through 100 million over that period.

The Hmong in there high mountain retreats of very in hospitable topography represent this same remnant of pure animists for Asia and the World, now in direct conflict since the colonial French invasion to modern times. These people have helped change history and saved many lives. They themselves have experienced modern  germ and chemical warfare kill whole villages of their people and concentration death camps by the North Vietnamese Army and continue the conflict into present times.The Vietnamese Army is still occupying Laos and the war against the Hmong continues. The Army Generals are deforesting Hmong Land to pay for their armies conveniently while Laos is still occupied since the Vietnam War.

The Hmong are keepers of immortality and the power base does not want it.

The world needs the Hmong. The world needs the secrets of the Hmong for its own survival.

The diametrical opposite is the Neo-Libertarian thinking that is responsible for the Hmong destruction and the destruction and poisoning of our planets water, air and soil, of the removal of our worlds forests and fish from all the Oceans.

What appears to be hopeless for all concerned, the Hmong show faith to a world we all will be so sorry to lose. They are fighting for you and me as we speak. I give my most sincerest and humblest thanks to these people for they give the lives of their children and themselves to hold onto what is true and valuable; they belong.

OITC by Mr. Fulford

More about the OITC

The man in charge of the secret organization known as the Office of International Treasury Control (IOTC) is R.C. Dan. Dan claims to be a Cambodian Prince and now lives in the Thai Royal family complex in Bangkok, Thailand. The man known to us as whistleblower is an Australian who used to work for him. The U.S. educated Mr. Dan claims special privileges in the Senate and the House by the United Nations. These may have been granted but then again it is hard to find many treaties or agreements the U.S. has not broken. He claims to be the sole arbiter, owner and controller of the The international collateral combined accounts of the global debt facility. He also claims to have 3^rd to 5^th level security clearance granted to him by the U.S. Congress. Dan was appointed in 1995 as the sole arbiter for the Bank of International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland. He also has the codes for 60 types of special “debt instruments” connected to a complex combination of countries, treaties, banks and other financial institutions. Most of these are now in deep trouble because of the quadrillions of dollars of toxic financial products based on nothing but fiat (out of nothing) money. So long as the Ponzi scheme known as Wall street collapses and economic discipline is imposed, the whole mess can be cleared up within 3 years.
These so-called “debt instruments” were created by the U.S. treasury department over the years and given to countries that have trade surpluses with the U.S. There are, for example, special sets of boxes specific only to certain countries or institutions.
The problem is that after nearly a century of issuing these debt boxes, the chickens are coming home to roost. President Obama tried at the recent G8 plus 5 meeting in Italy to borrow more money than George Bush junior did in 8 years. He was told a resounding no. The result should be total economic chaos in the U.S. by September 30^th .  The good news for the Americans is that it is not the U.S. that is bankrupt but rather a corporation known as the United States of America Corporation headquartered in the independent statelet known as Washington D.C. Once the Feds go down the drain of history, the American people will be provided with extremely generous funding to rebuild their industry and develop suppressed technology. The Pentagon will also be given generous funding to help it transform itself into a more benevolent organization. In the meantime, we know the Feds are not going to go quietly into the night so we have to be extremely vigilant in stopping whatever crazy thing they try next. The question for Mr. Dan is, when are you going to go public and tell the world the truth?

Dear Mr. Fulford,
Somehow, I suspect that the English version of your Japanese text is lacking a few things probably conveyed through inference. R.C. Dan is a bag man for the Octopus isn't he? You are systematically outing all of these folks so that they have no options left. Someone is feeding you the information with the intention of exposing all the various shell games going on around the world simultaneously. I guess this means that all the Ex-intelligence types who had survived on using their financial fraud talents will now have to get real jobs.
Below is copy from a story about the OITC. It was written in 2006. I saw the website relating to Mr. Dan and it explained the comment about the "Australian" whistleblower. The OITC is akin to the Brady Bond scam which extracted committment of resources from third world countries, securitized them and then failed to pay in gold as promised. Actually, that gold disappeared with the World Trade Center II.
With respect to the PLAGUE, I have some comments. The word is spreading. Don't tell your professors, tell your local newspapers, file injunction with county courts and let your states attorney know. Send the information to LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS not national ones. Local ones are the ones who are reporting on Concentration camps, UFOs and other stories that the national media won't touch. Eventually, when enough local coverage develops, the national media picks up on the story.
NEITHER THE MEDIA NOR STATE GOVERNMENT NOR EVEN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ARE MONTOLITHIC. The majority of the people working in these organizations don't have any idea what is going on. The culprits are a much smaller cabal within the larger groups. When the facts are presented correctly, most people listen. Just use the documents that Jane has provided (link is on her birdflu666 blog) and the stories about the Marine that almost died from his flu vaccination, the Polish homeless that have died and the other information...those facts plus the fact that the vaccine is UNTESTED will convince the people that you speak to that vaccinating everyone with a highly mutable (it mutates easily) untested vaccine is a bad idea for four very important reasons:
1. Exposing a mutable organism to a lot of different genetic material by vaccinating all kinds of people will ensure THAT IMPOSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE GENETIC MUTATIONS WILL OCCUR WITHIN THE FLU VIRUS. Those mutations will make the virus more deadly because it will have the keys to many more types of immune systems (remember that we are all different, the more types that the flu runs into, the faster it adapts to humanity itself.)
2. Baxter's vaccines have already proven fatal to large numbers of people during their tests. Even though the Polish homeless were vaccinated with the "avian" flu virus, its failures are indicative of problems with the concept for the vaccine, the labs that handled it or the medium that the vaccine is suspended in. Any one of those reasons means that the swine vaccine won't be much better.
3. Baxter Labs doesn't seem to have very good quality control. Their labs avian flu vaccine was lethal to a large number of homeless Polish people. They sent out LIVE VIRUS in huge quantities in March 2009 to countries around the world. If they are this careless with critical aspects of their processes, what faith can we have in their vaccines? There is no assurance that they won't send out live virus or co-mingled virus in the vaccine.
4. BECAUSE THERE ARE NOW LAWS THAT SHIELD BAXTER FROM ANY CONSEQUENCES FOR BAD VACCINE, THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO INCENTIVE TO PROVIDE SAFE VACCINE.
MK

MK

DAN STORY
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http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_6339.shtml
Police Commissioner cautions on partnership with OITC
Mar 7, 2006, 07:51 Email this page

Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes at a press conference this afternoon (o6/03) strongly advised anyone wanting to go into partnership with the Office of the International Treasury Control (OITC) to exercise caution and common sense as they have found a lot of irregularities with the company and its representative Mr Keith Scott.
Commissioner of Police Andrew Hughes at the press conference this afternoon. On the right is the Acting Director Corporate Communications with the Police Force Ms Sylvia Low

Speaking in his independent capacity of Commissioner of Police, Mr Hughes said the police force has made preliminary enquiries overseas regarding OITC and Mr Scott and nothing that they received gave credence or legitimacy to the organisation and Mr Scott.
“We’ve been monitoring closely the meetings that have been occurring between Mr Scott the representative of the OITC and the Viti Landowners Resource Association particularly the agreement between the two concerning a promise of US$6 billion deposited into a bank to be formed in Fiji through some partnership arrangement.
“What we can say is that the information that we do have at hand leads us to conclude that the proposed transaction is highly irregular, it is questionable and leaves me with a profound level of suspicion.”
Mr Hughes said at the moment there are a lot of unanswered questions but no one has lodged a complaint with Police.
He said if police suspicions are grounded then what happens in this type of cases is that people come forward and make a complaint when it is all too late.
Mr Hughes has therefore urged all those who are associated anyway with dealing to exercise the utmost caution.
“Please do not send any money if its requested as some form of an advanced fee for this transaction to proceed. Do not send any money until a complete and exhausted background check through independent means has been conducted.
“In a deal of this magnitude it is common sense that due diligence is conducted and that the full bona-fides of all parties is ascertained. And at this juncture what I can tell you is that Fiji Police is unable to do that based on our investigations overseas.”
Mr Huhges said while Mr Scott is known by Australian Authorities, he was not at liberty to divulge information on what Mr Scott was known for.
He also said the interesting thing about the whole venture was that the United Nations which deals with Governments does not know anything about OITC and this just leads on to many more unanswered questions and giving everyone a degree of suspicion and doubt that such a venture will really eventuate to the benefit of the landowners.
-End-